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I. INTRODUCTIONS EXUAL harassment is a pervasive problem that undermines the
work place by eating away at its victim's dignity, productivity, and
eagerness to come to work.' Sexual harassment is analogous to a
theft that robs not only the person but the company as well.2 Studies
show that over half of women3 in the workforce feel they have been the
victims of workplace sexual harassment. 4 Despite the magnitude of the
problem, federal law governing sexual harassment is of relatively recent
origin.5 The first case recognizing sexual harassment as a valid cause of
action occurred in 1976 in Williams v. Saxbe,6 which is considered to have
"laid the foundation for federal case law recognizing sexual harassment
as a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII."'7
1. Scientific research indicates that the cost of workplace sexual harassment to both
workers and employers is high. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychological Associa-
tion in Support of Neither Party at n.10-14, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1382
(1993) (No. 92-1168). Employees who are the victims of sexual harassment frequently
change jobs, transfer, or refrain from efforts to obtain jobs in order to avoid harassment.
In the process, they lose income, seniority, work alliances, references, established work
reputation, and personal confidence. Id. Workers who remain and endure the harassment
report adverse effects on their work performance, including loss of motivation, decreased
feelings of competence and self esteem, distraction, and negative performance evaluations
from harassers. Id. The magnitude of damage to sexual harassment victims translates into
a loss that affects their employers. Id. A 1988 study by the United States Merit Systems
Board found the cost of sexual harassment to the government (as employer) to be $267
million in just a two-year period. Id.
Further, the cost to employers who tolerate workplace sexual harassment can be ex-
pected to increase with the recent passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Under the Act,
a prevailing Title VII plaintiff may now be entitled to both compensatory and punitive
damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. 1992). The amount of those damages, however, must
not exceed $50,000 for employers with more than 14 and less than 101 employees, $100,000
for employers with more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees, $200,000 for employers
with more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees, and $300,000 for employers with more
than 500 employees. 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b) (Supp. 1992). (Previously, a prevailing Title VII
plaintiff's recovery was limited to injunctive relief including reinstatement, back pay, inter-
est, lost benefits, attorney's fees, and certain litigation costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988)).
2. Anne B. Fisher, Sexual Harassment What To Do, FORTUNE, Aug. 23, 1993, at 84.
3. This comment will focus on workplace sexual harassment of women by men be-
cause of the overwhelming reported number of women, as opposed to men, who have been
victimized by this form of harassment.
4. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 26-
32 (1979) (estimating that 49% to 90% of working women, depending on their various
occupations, have been the victim of sexual harassment).
5. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 615.5 (1982).
6. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
7. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 615.5 (1982).
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission8 guidelines provide
the following definition of sexual harassment:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual har-
assment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explic-
itly or implicitly a term of an individual's employment, (2)
submission or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as
the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3)
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment. 9
It is fairly well recognized that "[g]enerally, sexual harassment is any re-
peated and unwanted verbal, nonverbal, or physical advance of a sexual
nature-looks, touches, jokes, gestures, innuendoes, epithets, or proposi-
tions-by someone in the workplace which impedes a woman's enjoy-
ment of her work, her ability to do her work, or her employment
opportunities.' u 0
B. Two BASIC FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT: QUID PRO Quo
AND HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
Sexual harassment under Title VII consists of two principal types: quid
pro quo discrimination and hostile work environment harassment. 1
Quid pro quo is the more obvious form of sexual harassment insofar as it
generally involves the offer of tangible employment benefits by a supervi-
sor or employer in exchange for sexual favors from the subordinate em-
ployee.1 2 Hostile environment sexual harassment, whether or not linked
to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, consists of conduct
that has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individ-
ual's work performance or that which creates an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.' 3
C. Too MUCH CONFUSION IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
Since the first federal court decisions in the mid 1970s, the law of sex-
ual harassment has remained in a constant state of flux.14 Much of the
8. [hereinafter EEOC or Commission]
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1992).
10. Merrick T. Rossein, Work Environment - Sexual Harassment, C780 ALI-ABA 81,
88-89 (1993). Rossein further notes that "[s]exual harassment can take the form of a
'friendly' arm around the shoulder or 'accidental' brushes or touches" but that "[s]exual
harassment does not include the isolated instance where one employee asks another for a
date and, once rebuffed, leaves the matter alone." Id. at 89.
11. Martin v. Nannie and the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir. 1993).
12. Jeffrey A. Gettle, Sexual Harassment and the Reasonable Woman Standard: Is it a
Viable Solution?, 31 Duo. L. REV. 841, 842 (1993).
13. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
14. Rossein, supra note 10, at 86.
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litigation stems from issues arising in the hostile environment context.15
While most sexual harassment cases involve workplace harassment
among either employees or supervisors of the particular company, federal
courts are now recognizing that an employer may be held liable for the
harassment of its employees by non-employees. 16 The expansion of po-
tential sexual harassment claims beyond the 'normal' workplace setting
make the issue of employer liability of special importance because, with-
out employer liability, sexual harassment law is reduced to a mere theory
of workplace goals.17
This comment will explore the various standards governing employer
liability that are applied in the quid pro quo and hostile environment sex-
ual harassment settings. In doing so, this comment will first discuss the
two Supreme Court decisions governing the law of sexual harassment,
their effect on employer liability, and the inconsistency of the Meritor
Court's ruling on employer liability for hostile environment sexual har-
assment by a supervisor. Next, it will examine the relationship between
the quid pro quo and hostile environment causes of action where, argua-
bly, the quid pro quo action is too often being overlooked in favor of the
hostile environment alternative. This comment will then examine some
of the judicial reasoning, or lack thereof, present in sexual harassment
decisions, arguing that sexual harassment needs to be viewed in the con-
text of societal realities and their implications to the subordination of wo-
men in the workplace. Lastly, this comment will address employer
concerns of potential liability, recognizing that prudent employers need
not be overly concerned, and will delve into what types of "prompt and
appropriate" action can shield an employer from sexual harassment
liability.
15. Id.
16. David W. Garland, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment of Employees by
Non-Employees, C780 ALI-ABA 177 (1993). Garland notes that:
[t]hese cases raise a number of questions that remain to be litigated. For
example, did Congress, in enacting Title VII, intend that an employer should
be held liable for the actions of non-employees? Should agency principles be
used to determine an employer's liability for harassment by non-employees
when such non-employees are generally not agents of the employer? How
will it be determined when an employer has control over an alleged harasser
and when it does not? Does an employer always have control if it can end
the business relationship with the alleged harasser's enterprise? What should
an employer do to investigate the activities of people beyond its control?
Id. at 183.
17. See Rachel E. Lutner, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: The Morass of
Agency Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 590 (1993). Lutner
argues that:
neither current statutory nor judicial sexual harassment law is capable of pro-
viding clear, predictable, or relevant standards of employer liability. Without
more guidance, employer liability for sexual harassment will continue to
maintain a results-oriented approach where the standard applied matches the
result the court wants to reach, and employer liability will continue to be
imposed only in the most egregious cases.
[Vol. 48
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
II. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS TO THE ISSUE OF
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. MERITOR SA VINGS BANK V. VINsON
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of employer liability for sexual
harassment in the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson'8 yet
declined to give any bright line ruling on the subject.' 9 Meritor involved a
female bank employee, Mechelle Vinson, who brought an action against
her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, and Meritor Savings Bank, claiming that
she had constantly been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor, in vio-
lation of Title VII, during the four years she worked for the bank. Vinson
testified that Taylor made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors,
usually at the office, both during and after business hours, which Vinson
initially refused. Eventually, however, Vinson agreed out of what she de-
scribed as fear of losing her job. Vinson estimated that over the years she
had sex with Taylor some forty or fifty times. She further testified that
Taylor exposed himself to her, fondled her in front of other employees,
followed her into the employees' restroom when she went there alone,
and forcibly raped her on several occasions. Lastly, Vinson testified that
she never reported Taylor's harassment to any of his supervisors and
never attempted to use the bank's complaint procedure because she was
afraid of Taylor.20
The district court denied relief, holding that if Vinson and Taylor did
engage in a sexual relationship during the time of Vinson's employment,
the relationship was a voluntary one, having nothing to do with her con-
tinued employment or advancement at the bank, and that she was not the
victim of sexual harassment or discrimination. 2 1 The district court further
concluded, after noting the bank's express policy against discrimination,
that the bank was without notice and could not be held liable for the
alleged actions of Taylor.22 The court of appeals reversed and remanded
the case for further proceedings, holding that Vinson's grievance was
clearly that of hostile environment harassment and that the district court
had not considered whether a violation of this type had occurred.23 As to
18. 477 U.S. 57 (1989).
19. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. Justice Renquist, delivering the opinion of the court, ex-
plicitly stated: "We ... decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer
liability." Id.
20. Taylor denied Vinson's allegations claiming that he never fondled her, never made
suggestive remarks to her, and never engaged in or asked her to have sexual intercourse
with him. Instead, Taylor claimed that all of the accusations were made in response to a
business related dispute. The bank supported Taylor's position and further asserted that
any sexual harassment by Taylor was unknown to the bank and engaged in without its
consent or approval.
21. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 61.
22. Id. at 62.
23. Id. The court also found that the district court's conclusion that the sexual rela-
tionship was a voluntary one did not create the need for remand because the court was
uncertain as to precisely what the district court meant by this finding. Id. The court of
appeals held that if the evidence showed that Taylor made Vinson's toleration of the har-
assment a condition of employment, her voluntariness had no materiality. Id. The court
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
the bank's liability, the court of appeals held that "an employer is abso-
lutely liable for sexual harassment practiced by supervisory personnel,
whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the
misconduct. "24
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment, but for
different reasons. 25 Looking to the 1980 Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's Guidelines, 26 the Court, for the first time, held that a plain-
tiff may establish a Title VII violation by proving that discrimination
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment. 27 The
Supreme Court ruled that because the district court appeared to have
made its findings without ever considering the hostile environment theory
of sexual harassment, the court of appeals was correct in remanding the
case. 28 The Court further held that "[t]he gravaman of any sexual harass-
ment claim is that the alleged advances were 'unwelcome"' and that the
district court had erroneously focused on the voluntariness of Vinson's
participation in the alleged sexual episodes.29
The Supreme Court also commented on the issue of employer liability
by discussing the standards enunciated by the interested parties in their
respective briefs. 30 After discussing the various suggested alternatives,
conjured that the district court's finding of voluntariness might have been based on the
extensive testimony regarding Vinson's dress and personal fantasies that the court of ap-
peals felt had no place in the litigation of the case. Id. at 63. Note, however, that the
Supreme Court ultimately disagreed on the issue of the victim's speech and dress and held
that "[w]hile 'voluntariness' in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim, it does
not follow that the complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a
matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwel-
come." Id. at 68-69.
24. Id. at 63.
25. Id.
26. The court noted that "these Guidelines, 'while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
(quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
27. Id. Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
The Court did, however, condition its holding on recognition that "not all workplace
conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of
employment within the meaning of Title VII.... For sexual harassment to be actionable, it
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employ-
ment and create an abusive working environment."' Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
28. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
29. Id.
30. The suggested standards are as follows: The district court advocated that there
had to be some sort of notice for the employer to be held liable; the court of appeals and
Respondent (Vinson) took the opposite view and advocated strict liability for the employer
where a hostile environment is created by a supervisor's sexual advances, even though the
employer neither knew nor should have known of the alleged misconduct; Petitioner (Mer-
itor Bank) argued that Vinson's failure to use the bank's established grievance procedure
or to otherwise put the bank on notice insulated the bank from liability; the EEOC, in its
brief as amicus curiae, suggested that courts look to traditional agency principles when
formulating employer liability rules and, more specifically, when a sexual harassment case
[Vol. 48
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however, the Supreme Court stated that "[tihis debate over the appropri-
ate standard for employer liability has a rather abstract quality about it
given the state of the record in this case" and declined to issue a defini-
tive rule as to employer liability. 31 The Court did, however, agree with
the EEOC insofar as Congress intended for courts to look to agency prin-
ciples for guidance in this area.32 The Court reasoned that Congress's
decision to define "employer" in the context of Title VII to include any
"agent" of an employer evidenced a congressional intent to place some
limits on acts of employees for which employers should be held responsi-
ble.33 The Court stated: "For this reason, we hold that the court of ap-
peals erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable
for sexual harassment by their supervisors. For the same reason, absence
of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from
liability." 34
Finally, the Court rejected the bank's view that the mere existence of a
grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled with the
plaintiff's failure to invoke the procedure, must insulate the employer
from liability.35 The Court recognized that while those facts are relevant,
they are not always dispositive.36 Relying on the facts before it, the
Court noted that Meritor's general nondiscrimination policy did not spe-
cifically address sexual harassment and therefore did not alert employees
to their employer's interest in correcting that form of behavior. The
Court further recognized that the bank's grievance procedure required
the employee to first complain to her supervisor who, in Mechelle Vin-
son's case, was the alleged perpetrator, Sidney Taylor. Justice Renquist,
writing for the court, observed that "[s]ince Taylor was the alleged perpe-
rests solely on a "hostile environment" theory. The EEOC felt that those same principles
should lead to a rule that looks to whether the victim had a reasonably available avenue of
complaint, and if utilized, whether that procedure was reasonably responsive, urging that if
the victim fails to take advantage of that procedure, the employer should be shielded from
liability absent actual knowledge. The EEOC Guidelines, however, advocate holding an
employer liable for the acts of its agents without regard to notice and look to a determina-
tion of whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or agency capacity. Id. at 69-71.
31. Id. at 72.
32. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. Courts have looked to §§ 219-237 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958) for guidance in this area. See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp., 819
F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) and Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987), as
examples of attempts to apply agency principles to determine employer liability.
As subsequent observers have noted, the court's direction to look to agency principles
for guidance in this area has added considerable confusion to the employer liability issue.
See, e.g., Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Princi-
ples: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1230
(1991). Phillips argues that "after nearly five years of judicial floundering with agency
principles, it seems time for a change" and that "Meritor's command to consult agency law
was a bad ruling from almost every conceivable angle." Id. at 1230-31; see also Lutner,
supra note 17, at 602 (arguing that agency principles inject issues ill-suited to sexual harass-
ment fact patterns that have the potential to distract the court from the real question of
whether sexual harassment occurred and whether the employer should be held liable).
33. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.





trator, it is not altogether surprising that... [Vinson] failed to invoke the
procedure and report her grievance to him."'37 Renquist added that the
Bank's contention that it should be insulated from liability due to Vin-
son's failure to invoke the procedure "might be substantially stronger if
its procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of harassment
to come forward. '38
1. Inadequate Guidance has Resulted in Confusion and Inconsistency
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's refusal to issue a definitive ruling
on employer liability has caused much confusion and inconsistency in the
lower courts. As one commentator stated: "The guidance offered by
Meritor has proven inadequate, as appellate courts have interpreted it in
various ways. Despite Meritor, disagreement persists among the circuits
as to what should be the standard of employer liability for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment."
Most courts have not recognized, nor do they even discuss, how sexual
harassment contributes to the social inequality and subordination of wo-
men.39 Decisions such as Meritor that are void of any reference to the
social context and ramifications of sexual harassment, must cease. Courts
need to recognize that workplace equality is an issue of dominance that
gives men the power to systematically subordinate women. 40 As one
commentator recognized, sex discrimination in the form of sexual harass-
ment is "not the story of difference, [it is] the story of subordination. '41
2. Inconsistency in the Court's Holding Regarding Employer Liability
for Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor
Sexual harassment should be viewed as an act of dominance by men
over women that is very similar to the way racial harassment operates as
an act of dominance by white persons over racial minorities. 42 The devel-
opment of sexual harassment law, however, has reflected a judicial short
sightedness and has created numerous obstacles to victims' recoveries
that are not seen in other analogous areas of the law. 43 The Supreme
Court's refusal of strict liability to employers for sexual harassment car-
ried out by a supervisor in Meritor is an example of such an obstacle.44
Justice Marshall recognized that the refusal to grant strict liability was
such a hurdle and disagreed with the Court regarding its holding on em-
37. Id. at 73.
38. Id.
39. Maria M. Carillo, Hostile Environment Harassment by a Supervisor Under Title
VII: Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 50 (1992).
40. Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the
Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 174 (1994).
41. Id.
42. Carillo, supra note 39.




ployer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors.45 In his Meritor
concurring opinion, Justice Marshall stated that he would adopt the stan-
dard set out by the EEOC Guidelines that make an employer liable if "a
supervisor or an agent violates Title VII, regardless of knowledge or any
other mitigating factor."'46 Regarding acts between fellow employees,
Marshall and the EEOC endorsed the view that "an employer is responsi-
ble for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer
(or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of
the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate
corrective action. '47 Marshall recognized that an employer acts through
its employees and that discrimination is rarely carried out pursuant to the
formal approval of a corporation's board of directors. 48 Marshall further
recognized that Title VII law generally imputes liability to the employer
for the act of a supervisory employee or agent and stated:
When a supervisor discriminatorily fires or refuses to promote a
black employee, that act is, without more, considered the act of the
employer. The courts do not stop to consider whether the employer
otherwise had "notice" of the action, or even whether the supervisor
had actual authority to act as he did.49
Marshall also specifically rejected the Solicitor General's argument
that the case of a supervisor creating a hostile environment is different
because the supervisor is not exercising or threatening to exercise the
authority to make personnel decisions affecting the victim of the harass-
ment.50 Marshall called the Solicitor General's position untenable and
aptly recognized:
A supervisor's responsibilities do not begin and end with the power
to hire, fire, and discipline employees, or with the power to recom-
mend such actions. Rather, a supervisor is charged with the day-to-
day supervision of the work environment and with ensuring a safe,
productive workplace. There is no reason why abuse of the latter
authority should have different consequences than abuse of the for-
mer. In both cases it is the authority vested in the supervisor by the
employer that enables him to commit the wrong: it is precisely be-
cause the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer's
authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on
subordinates. There is therefore no justification for a special rule, to
be applied only in "hostile environment" cases, that sexual harass-
ment does not create employer liability until the employee suffering
discrimination notifies other supervisors. No such requirement ap-
pears in the statute, and no such requirement can coherently be
drawn from the law of agency.51
45. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 75.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 74 (quoting 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(c), (d) (1985)).
48. Id. at 75.
49. Id.
50. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 76.
51. Id. at 76-77. Marshall did, however, concede that there may be certain instances
where a limitation on employer liability for the acts of its supervisors is appropriate. Id. at
1994]
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In rejecting strict employer liability for hostile environment sexual har-
assment by a supervisor, the Court inconsistently applied Title VII to the
detriment of sexual harassment plaintiffs. Before sexual harassment was
recognized as a cause of action, courts consistently held employers liable
for discrimination carried out by their supervisors. 52 Today, employers
generally will not be held vicariously liable for the acts of a supervisor
unless the woman bringing the claim of hostile environment sexual har-
assment can prove that the employer had either actual or constructive
knowledge of the harassment and failed to take remedial action.53 "The
Meritor Court is primarily responsible for this divergence from vicarious
employer liability for hostile work environment by a supervisor. '54 Thus,
the employer liability standard being applied in most cases involving hos-
tile work environment sexual harassment by a supervisor represents a
clear divergence from all other types of discrimination law applicable to
the acts of a supervisor. 5
B. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS AGAIN: HARRIS V. FORKLIFT
SYSTEMS, INC.
The Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of sexual harassment in
the case of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.56 In Harris, the Court ex-
amined the various requirements needed to constitute a hostile work en-
vironment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.57 The case
before the Court involved Teresa Harris, a manager at Forklift Systems,
Inc., who was often insulted and made the target of unwanted sexual in-
nuendoes by Forklift's president, Charles Hardy. Such comments, made
in the presence of other employees, included the following: "You're a
woman, what do you know?" and "We need a man as the rental man-
ager."'58 Hardy also told Harris that she was a "dumb ass woman" and
suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Har-
ris's] raise."' 59 Hardy would also ask Harris and other female employees
to retrieve coins from his front pants pockets and would throw objects on
the ground, asking the women to pick up the objects.
Harris complained to Hardy about his conduct; Hardy replied that he
was only joking, was surprised that Harris was offended, and promised to
stop. Based on Hardy's promise, Harris stayed on the job. Hardy, how-
77. Marshall gave the example of a supervisor and employee working in two different parts
of the employer's business and the supervisor has no authority over the employee as an
instance where it may be improper to find "strict employer liability," but noted that those
considerations do not require the creation of special "notice" rules. Id.
52. Carillo, supra note 39, at 53. See also supra note 49 and accompanying text for
Justice Marshall's agreement on this point in his Meritor concurrence.
53. Carillo, supra note 39, at 57.
54. Marlissa Vinciguerra, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the
Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1730 (1989).
55. Carillo, supra note 39, at 75.
56. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
57. Id.




ever, did not keep his promise to end his harassing behavior. While Har-
ris was arranging a deal with one of Forklift's customers, Hardy asked
her, in front of other employees, "What did you do, promise the guy...
some [sex] Saturday night?" 60 Harris thereafter quit her job at Forklift
and sued claiming that Hardy's behavior created an abusive (hostile)
work environment for her because of her gender.
The district court found that Hardy's conduct did not create a hostile
environment because, while some of Hardy's comments offended Harris
and would be offensive to the reasonable woman, they were not so severe
as to have seriously affected Harris's psychological well-being. The
Supreme Court noted that the district court, in focusing on the em-
ployee's psychological well-being, was following Sixth Circuit prece-
dent.61 Given that the district court's ruling was consistent with circuit
precedent, it is not surprising that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the judgment in a brief unpublished opinion.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the
various circuits as to whether conduct must seriously affect the psycholog-
ical well-being of an employee or lead the employee to suffer injury to be
actionable. 62 The Court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice
O'Connor, held that the appropriate standard "takes a middle path be-
tween making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requir-
ing the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury."'63 The Court
adopted an objective/subjective standard holding that discrimination oc-
curs when conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile work environment that the victim perceives to be abusive.64 To be
actionable, the Court stated that the conduct must be more than the mere
utterance of an epithet that engenders offensive feelings in an employee,
but that Title VII would come into play before the harassing conduct
leads to a nervous breakdown.65 According to the Court:
This is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise
test .... [W]e can say that whether an environment is "hostile" or
"abusive" can be determined only by looking at all the circum-
stances. These may include the frequency of the discriminatory con-
duct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating;
or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with the employee's work performance. 66
The Court went on to hold that, while the effect on the employee's
psychological well-being is relevant as to whether the employee actually
found the environment abusive, psychological harm like any other factor
may be taken into account, but is not required to state a cause of action
60. Id.





66. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
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based on a hostile work environment under Title VII.67 The Court found
that the district court erred in focusing the fact finder's attention on
whether the conduct seriously affected the plaintiff's psychological well-
being or led her to suffer injury, holding that such injury is an element
that Title VII does not require.68 While the long term effects of the Har-
ris decision remain to be seen due to its recent origin, the lack of gui-
dance present in the decision indicates that the overall lack of
predictability in sexual harassment law can be expected to continue. Ad-
ditionally, recent cases decided under Harris indicate that plaintiffs can
expect to face a significant hurdle in merely establishing that the sexual
harassment endured was severe or pervasive enough to satisfy the dual
objective/subjective standard. 69
The decision, while reaffirming the overall merit of a sexual harassment
claim, failed to address the inconsistencies being applied to employer lia-
bility in the hostile environment context. It also failed to give any worka-
ble theory or context in which to apply the various standards. As Jane
Dolkart aptly recognized in a recent law review article:
The Supreme Court failed in Harris to provide a more detailed struc-
tural and contextualized explanation of the ways in which sexual har-
assment works as a barrier to equal employment and harms women
as a class. Such an account would tell the everyday stories of women
struggling to survive and work in a world where sexualized abuse and
violence is the background of their lives. It would explain the place
of sexual harassment in the continuum of degradation and violence
and the role it plays in women's workplace subordination. Such an
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Kidwai v. McDonald's Corp., 21 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that
supervisor's noticing plaintiff's new boyfriend, telephoning her at home, wanting to meet
her mother, discussing vacation and leisure activities, asking her to cook dinner at her new
home, driving rapidly while acting like a boor, using profanity, and a late night telephone
call wherein he asked whether plaintiff was in bed with someone lacked the severity to
make out a sexual harassment claim since an objective "reasonable person" would not find
such conduct pervasive enough to create a hostile or abusive work environment); Saxton
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that two instances of
sexual misconduct coupled with a condescending, impatient, and mocking attitude toward
plaintiff insufficient to meet the objective prong of pervasive harassment that has been
deemed actionable); Nishijima v. Morton Grove Park Dist., No. 9305193, 1994 WL 142967,
at *4 (N.D. II1. Apr. 15, 1994) (holding that conduct where supervisor told stories about
strange sex, wild parties, and the women he had been with, made sexual remarks and innu-
endoes toward plaintiff, shoved the plaintiff in the lunch room after she refused to get him
a fork, threatened to cut plaintiff's hours, and picked up plaintiff's decorative pumpkins
and stabbed with pocket knife while she looked on as incapable of stating a hostile envi-
ronment harassment claim because such conduct, according to the court, was incapable of
satisfying the objective standard of creating a hostile environment in the eyes of a reason-
able person); Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, 843 F. Supp. 1278, 1279 (S.D. Ind. 1994)
(finding environment where, among numerous other allegations, supervisor commented on
plaintiff's appearance repeatedly in a sexual manner, patted her rear end on two occasions
after being told by plaintiff that such conduct was offensive, and where co-workers asked
her out on dates (even though plaintiff was married), inquired if she tanned in the nude,
questioned her about what she wore to bed, gave her obscene notes, commented on her
breasts, sexually propositioned her, and where plaintiff was ultimately raped on the prem-
ises by an unknown assailant as not rising to the level of actionable sexual harassment).
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understanding would aid judges and juries in the interpretation of
facts and the construction of meanings given to those facts in evalu-
ating when workplace conduct denies women equal employment
opportunity. 70
Such a contextualized explanation would have potentially offered some
guidance to the inconstancies plaguing sexual harassment law and its rela-
tion to the imposition of employer liability for such harassment. Unfortu-
nately, the two Supreme Court decisions on sexual harassment offer little
guidance to courts and employers as to the boundaries of employer liabil-
ity for sexual harassment. Due, at least in part to this inadequacy, the
overall state of confusion on these issues can be expected to continue.
III. QUID PRO QUO HARASSMENT: STRICT EMPLOYER
LIABILITY
The EEOC takes the position that "[a]n employer will always be held
responsible for 'quid pro quo' harassment."'71 Courts endorse this view72
with the rationale for the imposition of automatic liability being that
when a supervisor exercises the authority to make decisions affecting a
subordinate's employment status, those actions are properly imputed to
the employer, whose delegation of authority empowered the supervisor
to take such actions.73
A recent example of a quid pro quo harassment claim can be found in
Karibian v. Columbia University.74 Sharon Karibian worked in Columbia
University's fundraising office which was administered by an independent
contractor, Philanthropy Management Company (PMI), and was staffed
by both Columbia and PMI employees. Karibian was an employee of
70. Dolkart, supra note 40, at 193.
71. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE No. N-915-050, CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT § (D)(1) (1990) [hereinafter EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE].
72. In fact, "[elvery court of appeals to address this issue in the quid pro quo context
has held the employer absolutely liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor." Rossein,
supra note 10, at 92-93.
For courts imposing this strict liability standard, see, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14
F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 1994 WL 161790 (June 13, 1994); Chamberlin v. 101
Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 785 (1st Cir. 1990); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867
F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989); McCollum v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602, 610 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied sub nom. McCollum v. Tisch, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987); Highlander v. KFC Nat'l
Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986); Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d
599, 604-06 (7th Cir. 1985); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1983);
Gilbert v. Little Rock, Ark., 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979).
73. David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment at Work, C742 ALI-ABA 465, 487 (1992); see
also EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 71, stating that:
Although the question of employer liability for "quid pro quo" harassment
was not at issue in Vinson, the Court's decision noted with apparent approval
the position taken by the Commission in its brief that: "where a supervisor
exercises the authority actually delegated to him by his employer, by making
or threatening to make decisions affecting the employment status of his sub-
ordinates, such actions are properly imputed to the employer whose delega-
tion of authority empowered the supervisor to undertake them."
Id. § (D)(1).
74. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Columbia and Mark Urban was appointed as her supervisor. Urban had
the power to alter Karibian's work schedule and assignments, and to give
her promotions and raises which were subject to approval. He also had at
least the apparent authority to fire Karibian. Karibian alleged 75 that Ur-
ban pursued her by inviting her out to bars under the pretext of discuss-
ing work related matters, and on those occasions often asked Karibian
back to his apartment. Initially, Karibian refused Urban's advances but
later yielded to pressure from Urban. Karibian alleged that Urban co-
erced her into a violent sexual relationship by telling her that she owed
him for all he was doing for her as her supervisor. She also claimed that
her conditions of employment would vary depending on her responsive-
ness to Urban. Karibian believed that she would be fired if she did not
yield to Urban's demands.
The court recognized that quid pro quo harassment occurs when "sub-
mission to or rejection of [unwelcome sexual] conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual. '76
The court then held that a plaintiff must present evidence that she was
subject to unwelcome sexual conduct, and that her reaction to that con-
duct was then used as the basis for decisions affecting the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment in order to establish a
prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment. 77 According to the court,
because the quid pro quo harasser, by definition, uses the employer's au-
thority to alter the terms and conditions of employment, either actually
or apparently, the law imposes strict liability.78 The court further recog-
nized that evidence of actual, as opposed to threatened, economic loss
was not necessary to state a valid claim of quid pro quo harassment. 79 In
this case, the court found that Karibian's allegations, if true, would consti-
tute quid pro quo harassment because Urban made and threatened to
make decisions affecting Karibian's employment based upon her submis-
sion to his sexual advances. 80
75. The case was on appeal from a summary judgment issued in favor of defendants,
therefore, the discussion was limited to Karibian's version of events.
76. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 777 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1993)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 778.
79. Id.
80. Id. Regarding Karibian's hostile environment claim, the court recognized that
"[w]hereas liability for quid pro quo harassment is always imputed to the employer, a
plaintiff seeking to establish harassment under a hostile environment theory must demon-
strate some specific basis to hold the employer liable for the misconduct of its employees"
and that "[u]nfortunately, the 'specific basis' of employer liability for a hostile environment
remains elusive." Id. at 779. Looking to agency law, the court enunciated the following
standard:
We hold that an employer is liable for the discriminatorily abusive work envi-
ronment created by a supervisor if the supervisor uses his actual or apparent
authority to further the harassment, or if he was otherwise aided in accom-
plishing the harassment by the existence of the agency relationship.
Id. at 780. Under the circumstances of the case, the court found that Columbia would be
liable for Urban's harassment regardless of the absence of notice or the reasonableness of
Columbia's complaint procedure. The court recognized: "It would be a jarring anomaly to
hold that conduct which always renders an employer liable under a quid pro quo theory
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN QUID PRO QUO AND
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT
In a 1989 law review article, Marlissa Vinciguerra recognized that
courts have consistently relied upon the hostile environment framework
to the exclusion of the quid pro quo cause of action in cases involving
certain forms of economic detriment, thus severely limiting the class of
plaintiff's and types of behavior covered by quid pro quo harassment.
81
Vinciguerra noted that "[m]isuse of the hostile environment claim as a
catch all for sexual harassment complaints involving economic detriment
limits quid pro quo analysis to the 'clear cut' . . . model, in which a super-
visor verbally demands sexual submission, a woman refuses, and the su-
pervisor immediately fires or demotes his recalcitrant victim."'82 In many
cases, the presence of hostile environment harassment during the period
between the advances and adverse employment decisions "apparently
blinded the courts to the facts giving rise to quid pro quo harassment.
'83
Courts have been seemingly comfortable in denying a sexual harass-
ment plaintiff her quid pro quo claim due to an availability of an alterna-
tive hostile environment claim and the fact that it is not a complete denial
of her cause of action.84 "For a court that is uncomfortable with the facts
of a case or unreceptive to sexual harassment claims... [h]ostile environ-
ment harassment is a 'safe' alternative for a court that is concerned with
shielding the employer from undue exposure to liability."'85 Thus, hostile
environment sexual harassment becomes the overused vehicle for cases in
which the harassment potentially falls into both categories.
8 6
does not result in liability to the employer when the same conduct becomes so severe and
pervasive as to create a discriminatorily abusive work environment." Id.
81. Vinciguerra, supra note 54, at 1718. Vinciguerra argues that the "courts' failure to
incorporate evolving forms of economic detriment into the quid pro quo model thwarts the
remedial promise of Title VII." Id. at 1721.
82. Id. at 1718. Vinciguerra cites the cases of Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986);
Hicks v. Yates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); and Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), as examples of cases where the plaintiffs endured non economic lewd
behavior in addition to the threats or advances and were not immediately discharged or
demoted following the threats or advances, thus shifting the courts' attention to the hostile
environment cause of action, to the exclusion of a potential quid pro quo claim.
Vinciguerra, supra note 54, at 1718.
For example, Vinciguerra attacks the Meritor decision for ignoring the potential quid pro
quo claim and states:
By failing to analyze Vinson's claim as both hostile environment and quid
pro quo harassment, the Court avoided resolving how a proven hostile envi-
ronment violation affects a plaintiff's burden of proof for a quid pro claim.
This omission is significant because nearly all sexual harassment plaintiffs
allege both hostile environment and quid pro quo harassment.
Id. at 1729. Additionally, because courts have discretion to "label" sexual harassment
claims, "[tlhe different standards of employer liability for the two types of sexual harass-
ment provide incentives for the courts to assign alleged harassment to one category as
opposed to the other." Lutner, supra note 17, at 609.
83. Vinciguerra, supra note 54, at 1728.





This failure to consider the quid pro quo claim is important in its rela-
tion to employer liability because, as discussed, a finding of quid pro quo
harassment leads to the imposition of employer liability. 87 Quid pro quo
harassment was developed by courts to rectify economic loss suffered
from sexual harassment. 88 Therefore, where threats and/or advances are
followed by detrimental employment decisions affecting the sexual har-
assment plaintiff, the quid pro quo claim should not be summarily dis-
missed. Instead, courts need to recognize that while a harasser may not
explicitly state, "sleep with me or else your job and the opportunities that
go along with it will suffer," this is, in fact, the implicit quid pro quo of
such behavior.
V. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT-CONFUSION
BEFORE AND AFTER MERITOR
Courts have been fairly ineffective and inconsistent in adjudicating the
hostile environment sexual harassment claim.89 While the Meritor deci-
sion ended the debate as to the existence of a hostile environment claim
under Title VII, the decision failed to address the question of what pre-
cise conduct would create a sexually hostile environment.90 The lack of
consistency in the circuit courts' decisions led one commentator to note
that "[i]f any consistency did exist in the courts' decisions, it rested on the
fact that few plaintiffs prevailed under a hostile environment sexual har-
assment theory." 91 This ineffectiveness may result from the courts' un-
willingness to understand the underlying intricacies and problems of the
sexual harassment claim itself.92
87. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of employer liability
in the quid pro quo context.
88. Vinciguerra, supra note 54, at 1734.
89. See Gettle, supra note 12.
90. Id. at 846.
91. Id. at 847-48. Gettle notes that "in some cases the courts found lewd comments,
inquiries, and jokes, the use of sexual epithets, and/or the prominent display of porno-
graphic materials to constitute sexual harassment. By contrast, other courts confronted
with the same conduct ruled that such conduct did not constitute sexual harassment." Id.
at 847.
Another commentator, recognizing that the courts have not yet offered any bright line
tests, noted that the courts seem to react to the "mix" of factors present in a given case.
Peter M. Panken et al., Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Employer Liability for the
Sins of the Wicked, C669 ALI-ABA 221, 237 (1991). Such factors generally include the
nature of the offensive conduct, pervasiveness of the conduct, relative position of the
harasser and victim, employer good faith (this includes the presence or lack of an an-
nounced policy, effective enforcement mechanism, usable grievance procedure, speed of
employer's reaction after employer learned of the harassment, reasonableness of the inves-
tigation of complaints, protection of the complainer from retaliation, punishment of the
perpetrator, and whether the harassment ended), injury to the victim, and the reasonable-
ness of the victim's reaction. Id. at 237-38.
92. Gettle, supra note 12, at 846. Gettle argues that part of this failure is a result of
the judiciary's unwillingness to attempt to understand and take into account the female's
perspective of sexual harassment. Id. But see infra notes 102-19 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Ellison v. Brady and the methodology behind the Ninth Circuit's adoption
of the reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases.
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To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under the hostile
environment theory, a plaintiff must show five things: (1) that she be-
longs to a protected group; (2) that she was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harass-
ment affected some term or condition or privilege of employment; and, if
appropriate, (5) some ground to hold the employer liable.93 A sampling
of recent cases, however, led one author to conclude that, in the hostile
work environment sexual harassment arena, the "proverbial gray area
may be getting larger" due to the lack of any "bright lines" on the sub-
ject.94 That same author notes:
One of the interesting problems in defining hostile work environ-
ment sexual harassment concerns the extent to which consideration
should be given to the prevalent mores in society. Television, mov-
ies, magazines, and newspapers are filled with sexually oriented top-
ics. Moreover, dating in the workplace is not an uncommon
phenomenon.... In view of this backdrop, some courts have taken
the position that it is unreasonable for employers, at the first in-
stance, to have the responsibility to censor or monitor workplace be-
havior between the sexes.95
This viewpoint of the courts, while seemingly prevalent, is not appropri-
ate. Sexual harassment is supported by cultural myths and stereotypes
that sanction male violence toward women and then trivialize its conse-
quences. 96 These institutionalized societal views and stereotypes support
female subordination and perpetuate male power in the workplace;
"[s]exual harassment both reflects and supports women's inferior work-
place position. '97 By ignoring the problem and rationalizing sexual har-
assment based on societal views of sexuality outside the workplace, courts
are ignoring the Title VII mandate that employers provide a workplace
free from sexually offensive behavior. As recognized in a recent decision:
"The purpose of Title VII is not to import into the workplace the
prejudices of the community, but through law to liberate the workplace
from the demeaning influence of discrimination, and thereby to imple-
ment the goals of human dignity and economic equality in
employment." 98
A. THE COURTS' RESPONSE REGARDING EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
There are few bright line rules for determining when the various courts
will deem action taken by employers to have been "prompt and appropri-
ate." Clearly, however, courts are more likely to find employer liability
93. Collins v. Baptist Memorial Geriatric Ctr., 937 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1991).
94. Louis Pechman, Emerging Issues in Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment,
65 N.Y. ST. B.J. 38 (1993).
95. Id. at 38-39.
96. Dolkart, supra note 40, at 185.
97. Id. at 182-83.
98. King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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where the employer lacks a workable policy against sexual harassment
and, having actual or constructive knowledge, tolerates the hostile work-
ing environment by failing to take appropriate corrective action. 99 Sur-
prisingly or perhaps not surprisingly, there are still many reported cases
where the employer has no anti-discrimination policy or grievance proce-
dure and has tolerated offensive sexual harassment by its employees and/
or supervisors over a period of time. 1°° Additionally, courts are more
likely to find employer liability where supervisors have either condoned
or participated in the behavior.' 0 ' The problem then becomes when em-
ployers do take some form of action, what type of action taken by em-
ployers will be deemed by the courts to be "prompt and appropriate"?
1. Employer Liability for Co-Worker Sexual Harassment: What
Remedial Actions Can Shield Employers from Liability?
In the pivotal case of Ellison v. Brady, 0 2 which established the "rea-
sonable woman" standard for hostile environment sexual harassment
cases, 103 the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of what remedial actions
99. See, e.g., EEOC v. Gurnee Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 816-17 (7th Cir. 1990) (af-
firming injunctive relief against the employer where there was no real policy against sexual
harassment and management was aware of the harassment but did nothing); Baker v. Wey-
erhaeuser, 903 F.2d 1342, 1345 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that employer failed to take action
in a timely fashion where pervasive sexual harassment had continued for over six months
and employee had complained to her supervisor who did nothing in response even though
the supervisor was required under a company policy to report such complaints); Bohen v.
City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1187-88 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding employer liable
where there was no written policy against sexual harassment and the employer knew about
the situation but considered it to be the "female employees' problem and advised them
not to socialize and to dress to cover themselves).
100. Hope A. Comisky, "Prompt and Effective Remedial Action?" What Must an Em-
ployer Do to Avoid Liability for "Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harassment, 8 LAB.
LAW. 181, 184 (1992).
101. For example, in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D.
Fla. 1991), the court found the employer liable, even though a policy against sexual harass-
ment was enacted, because the supervisors permitted the employees to circulate sexually
offensive materials and had a pattern of unsympathetic responses to employee complaints
of sexual harassment. Id. at 1518-19. See also Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 907 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that employer's failure to investigate plaintiffs alle-
gations of sexual harassment could constitute gross negligence amounting to deliberate
indifference); Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989) (holding an employer liable who was aware of sexually ex-
plicit cartoons in the men's room and permitted them to remain).
102. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
103. The reasonable woman standard recognizes that "[clonduct that many men con-
sider unobjectionable may offend many women." Id. at 878. The court recognized:
Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understand-
ably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual
assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual con-
duct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or the un-
derlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive .... We adopt the
perspective of the reasonable woman primarily because we believe that a
sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male biased and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women .... By acknowledging and
not trivializing the effects of sexual harassment on reasonable women, courts
can work towards ensuring that neither men nor women will have to "run the
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can shield employers for co-worker sexual harassment. 1°4 Kerry Ellison
met her eventual harasser, Sterling Gray, during her initial training as a
revenue agent for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). As co-workers,
the two worked in the same office but never became friends nor did they
ever work closely together. In June 1986, Gray asked Ellison to lunch
when no one else was in the office; Ellison accepted and the two had
lunch. According to Ellison, after the June lunch, Gray started to pester
her by hanging around her desk and asking unnecessary questions. On
October 9, 1986, Gray asked Ellison out for a drink after work and she
refused, suggesting they have lunch the following week. Ellison did not
want to be alone with Gray and tried to avoid the office during lunch
time. One day during the following week, however, Gray again asked
Ellison to lunch and she refused.
Gray then wrote Ellison a bizarre note which read: "I cried over you
last night and I'm totally drained today. I have never been in such con-
stant term oil [sic]. Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to
feel your hatred for another day."'10 5 The note frightened Ellison who
later showed it to her supervisor but asked the supervisor not to do any-
thing about it so Ellison could try first to handle it herself. Gray called in
sick the next day and Ellison left for a four week training program in St.
Louis, Missouri without having any contact with Gray. Gray then mailed
her a card that stated, in part: "I know that you are worth knowing with
or without sex .... I have enjoyed you so much over these past few
months. Watching you. Experiencing you from 0 so far away.' 10 6 Elli-
son immediately telephoned her supervisor and requested that either she
or Gray be transferred because she would be uncomfortable working in
the same office as him. Ellison's supervisor contacted her superior and
discussed the problem. Ellison's supervisor met with Gray that same day
informing him that he was entitled to union representation and ordered
him to leave Ellison alone. Gray subsequently transferred to the San
Francisco office and, after three weeks, filed union grievances requesting
his return. The grievances were settled in Gray's favor allowing him to
transfer back provided he spend four more months in San Francisco and
promise not to bother Ellison. Ellison received a letter from her supervi-
sor that indicated management had decided to resolve the problem with a
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work
and make a living."
Id. at 879-80 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
This "reasonable woman" standard can be compared with the alternative of a "reason-
able person" standard. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). See also Dolkart, supra note 40, at 154 (proposing that
courts adopt a contextualized reasonableness standard that places the hypothetical reason-
able person in the situation of the victim, with the experiences and perceptions of the
victim).
104. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 873.




six-month separation, and that it would take additional action if the prob-
lem recurred.
Ellison then filed a formal complaint with the IRS who rejected the
complaint, concluding that it did not describe a pattern or practice of sex-
ual harassment. 10 7 After an appeal, the EEOC affirmed the decision on
the ground that the agency took adequate action to prevent the repetition
of Gray's offensive conduct. 10 8 Ellison then filed a complaint in federal
district court wherein the court granted summary judgment in favor of
the government, holding that Ellison had failed to state a prima facie case
of hostile environment sexual harassment. 10 9 The court of appeals re-
versed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings." 0
In its decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit demon-
strated that employers can be held responsible for the acts of their em-
ployees, even in a situation where they arguably took prompt and
appropriate action to remedy the harassment. While recognizing that not
all harassment warrants dismissal, the court held that an employer's rem-
edy should persuade harassers to discontinue unlawful conduct."' The
court mandated that employers impose sufficient penalties, assessed pro-
portionately to the seriousness of the offensive conduct, to assure a work-
place free from sexual harassment. 112 The court stated:
In essence, then, we think that the reasonableness of an employer's
remedy will depend on its ability to stop harassment by the person
who engaged in harassment. In evaluating the adequacy of the rem-
edy, the court may also take into account the remedy's ability to per-
suade potential harassers to refrain from unlawful conduct. Indeed,
107. Id. at 875.
108. Id.
109. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 882. This mandate is expected to broaden the spectrum of employer liability.
As one commentator noted:
The standard the Ellison court sets forth is one of broader liability for em-
ployers than before. They have to take remedies "reasonably calculated to
end the harassment," but measured from the reasonable woman's perspec-
tive. This can mean that harassers who regard their behavior as well-inten-
tioned still may cause an employer to be liable when the employer knows (or
should have known) of the conduct and failed to take appropriate action.
The new standard will most likely mean that more women will prevail against
employers who fail to adequately rectify the situation.
Angela Baker, Employment Law - The "Reasonable Woman" Standard Under Ellison v.
Brady: Implications For Assessing the Severity of Sexual Harassment and the Adequacy of
Employer Response, 17 J. CORP. L. 691, 712-13 (1992).
112. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882. The court specifically rejected that the appropriate in-
quiry be what a reasonable employer would do to remedy the harassment since, although
employers are required to provide a workplace free from sexual harassment, business rea-
sons may make them reluctant to punish high ranking and highly productive employees
and also runs the risk of reinforcing any prevailing level of discrimination. Id. at n.17. An
excellent example highlighting the ramifications of this concern is Kopp v. Samaritan
Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1993), where a hospital did virtually nothing and
allowed a doctor to sexually harass and abuse hospital employees because the doctor
brought in millions of dollars of yearly revenue for the hospital.
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meting out punishments that do not take into account the need to
maintain a harassment-free working environment may subject the
employer to suit by the EEOC.113
Regarding Ellison's situation, the court rejected the government's as-
sertion that it complied with its statutory obligation by promptly investi-
gating Ellison's allegation, and by granting her request for a temporary
transfer to San Francisco. 114 The court stated:
We strongly believe that the victim of sexual harassment should not
be punished for the conduct of the harasser. We wholeheartedly
agree with the EEOC that a victim of sexual harassment should not
have to work in a less desirable location as a result of an employer's
remedy for sexual harassment. 15
Ellison argued that the government's remedy was insufficient because it
failed to discipline Gray and allowed him to return to the San Mateo
office after only six months of separation. The court, apparently agreeing
with Ellison's contention, declined to view the government's response as
reasonable. 116 Instead, the court noted that Ellison's employer had not
expressed strong disapproval of Gray's conduct, did not reprimand him
or put him on any form of probation, and did not tell him that any further
harassment would result in his dismissal or termination. 117 According to
the court, Title VII mandates more than a mere request to the alleged
harasser to refrain from discriminatory conduct."18 Ultimately, the court
held that "[i]f Ellison can prove on remand that Gray knew or should
have known that his conduct was unlawful and that the government failed
to take even the mildest form of disciplinary action, the district court
should hold that the government's initial remedy was insufficient under
Title VII. ' 119
An interesting case by which to compare the judicial reasoning present
in Ellison is Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. 120 In Rabidue, the plaintiff,
Vivienne Rabidue, initially worked as a secretary and was later promoted
to the position of administrative assistant. The court, focusing its atten-
tion on the plaintiff, stated that her supervisors and co-employees "found
her to be an abrasive, rude, antagonistic, extremely willful, uncoopera-
113. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 882.
117. Id.
118. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882. The rationale for this requirement is that by not disciplin-
ing employees for sexual harassment, employers send the wrong message to potential ha-
rassers. Id.
119. Id. Regarding the reasonableness of the separation, the court stated that the evi-
dence did not make it clear as to whether the six month cooling off period was reasonably
calculated to end the harassment or whether it was assessed proportionately to the serious-
ness of Gray's conduct and ordered the district court, on remand, to fully explore the facts
concerning the government's decision to return Gray to San Mateo. Id. at 883.
120. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). Rabidue is "[p]erhaps the most well-known example
of a case where a court took a 'boys-will-be-boys' attitude regarding what constitutes ac-
tionable hostility in connection with merely verbally explicit sexual comments ....
Panken, supra note 91, at 254.
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tive, and irascible personality.' 121 The court further stated that Rabidue
consistently argued with her co-workers, customers, and company man-
agement in such a manner that jeopardized business relationships with
major oil companies and was an overall "troublesome employee."'1 22
Rabidue's sexual harassment complaint arose out of her dealings with
Douglas Henry, the supervisor of the company's key punch and computer
section. Neither he nor Rabidue had any supervisory authority over one
another but worked together since part of Rabidue's duties required her
to coordinate with Henry's department and personnel.
In characterizing Douglas Henry, the court stated: "Henry was an ex-
tremely vulgar and crude individual who customarily made obscene com-
ments about women generally, and, on occasion, directed such
obscenities to the plaintiff. Management was aware of Henry's vulgarity,
but had been unsuccessful in curbing his offensive personality traits dur-
ing the time encompassed by this controversy. 1 23 In addition to Henry's
vulgar comments, other offensive conduct in the workplace included pic-
tures of nude or scantily clad women displayed in other male employees'
offices. Ultimately, Rabidue was discharged for a host of enunciated rea-
sons allegedly irrespective of her sexual harassment complaint. 124
In rejecting Rabidue's charge of sexual harassment, the court stated
that assessing whether actions give rise to a hostile working environment
required the trier to judge the facts based on a "totality of the circum-
stances" approach.1 25 The court found such circumstances to include the
background and experiences of the plaintiff, the totality of the physical
environment of the plaintiff's work area, and "the lexicon of obscenity
that pervaded the environment of the workplace both before and after
the plaintiff's introduction into its environs.' 26 The court ruled that the
presence of actionable hostile environment sexual harassment would be
different depending upon the personality of the victim and the prevailing
work environment. 127 The court went on to quote Judge Newblatt, the
district court judge, who stated:
121. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The reasons given for Rabidue's termination were her irascible and opinionated
personality, her inability to work with co-workers and customers, a heated argument with
the company's vice-president regarding the implementation of certain accounting practices
and procedures, and a "vitriolic confrontation" with the vice-president of a major customer
concerning pricing schedules. Id.
125. Id. at 620. The court also adopts the "reasonable person" standard and mandates
that the circumstances be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person's reaction to
a similar environment under the given circumstances. Id. This standard can be compared
to that of the "reasonable woman" standard enunciated in Ellison. See supra note 103.
126. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. This approach is flawed insofar as it focuses on the
victim of harassment; the background and experiences of a sexual harassment plaintiff are
an improper arena in which to delve since, by doing so, the court not only violates that





Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environ-
ments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual
jokes, sexual conversations, and girlie magazines may abound. Title
VII was not meant to-or can-change this. It must never be forgot-
ten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle for
equal employment opportunity for the female workers of America.
But it is quite different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring
about a magical transformation in the social mores of American
workers. 128
The court further held that to prevail in a hostile working environment,
the plaintiff must prove the existence of respondeat superior liability.129
The court ultimately concluded that the record effectively disclosed that
Henry's obscenities, "although annoying, were not so startling as to have
affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff or other female employ-
ees." 130 The court felt that the evidence did not demonstrate that this
single employee's vulgarity substantially affected the totality of the work-
place and that the sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimus
effect on the plaintiff's work environment when considered in the context
of a society that condones, publicly features, and commercially exploits
such displays.' 3 '
The dissent disagreed with the views and steps taken in this case. In his
dissent, Justice Kieth stated:
"Society" in this scenario must primarily refer to the unenlightened;
I hardly believe reasonable women condone the pervasive degrada-
tion and exploitation of female sexuality perpetuated in American
culture.... The presence of pin-ups and misogynous language in the
workplace can only evoke and confirm the debilitating norms by
which women are primarily and contemptuously valued as objects of
male sexual fantasy.132
Substantial social science research supports Justice Kieth's observations
and indicates that gender has a strong effect on an individual's perception
as to what constitutes sexual harassment, with women more likely to label
such conduct as harassing or offensive. 133 Thus, "women experience sex-
ualized conduct as part of a pattern of violence used as an instrument of
control over their lives. As such, instances of sexualized behavior toward
women in the workplace are experienced by women as inherently coer-
cive and frightening even when such behavior is judged harmless by
men."'1 34 Some courts, like the one in Ellison, have incorporated this re-
alization into their analysis. Unfortunately, many courts, like the one in
Rabidue, have either misconstrued such realities or have ignored them all
together.
128. Id. at 620-21.
129. Id. at 621.
130. Id. at 622.
131. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622.
132. Id.




So where does this leave the law governing employer liability for sexual
harassment? The answer is extremely unclear. As illustrated by Ellison
v. Brady, the employer's procedure of separating the parties may not sat-
isfy this "prompt and appropriate remedial action" requirement 135
although it has been held to satisfy the requirement in certain factual
settings.136 It is also not altogether certain what other types of employer
action, short of the termination 137 of the alleged harasser, will be deemed
sufficient by the courts. 138 Recent decisions, however, illustrate a judicial
willingness to exempt from liability employers who took some form of
remedial action.139
A recent example of actions taken by an employer deemed to have
satisfied the "prompt and appropriate remedial action requirement" is
the Fifth Circuit case of Nash v. Electrospace System, Inc.'40 In Nash, the
court affirmed a summary judgment granted in favor of the employer on
the plaintiff's sexual harassment charge due to the efficacy of the em-
ployer's procedures for responding to harassment.141 The court held that
"[w]hen a company, once informed of allegations of sexual harassment,
takes prompt remedial action to protect the claimant, the company may
avoid Title VII liability. ' 142
Denise Nash initially worked for an affiliate of Electrospace System,
Inc. (ESI) as a computer data entry operator and later transferred to ESI
135. See infra notes 140-59 and accompanying text. See also Wheeler v. Southland
Corp., 875 F.2d 1246, 1249-50 (6th Cir. 1989) (deeming employer response of temporarily
transferring a new supervisor to location with no indication of whether it was a permanent
change to be insufficient).
136. For example, in Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.
1987), the court held that when an employee reported harassment to the president of the
company and he told her she would not have to work with the alleged harasser after the
presentations ended (a day and a half later), the president's, i.e., employer's, actions were
appropriate. Id. at 309.
137. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential em-
ployer liability issues that arise when the alleged harasser is terminated.
138. See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp, 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987); Hirschfeld v. New Mex-
ico Corrections Dept., 916 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990); Barret v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d
424 (8th Cir. 1984).
139. See, e.g., Carmon v. Lubrizol, 17 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that com-
pany which investigated complaint the day it was brought to its attention and reprimanded
alleged harasser in writing and transferred him to another shift and that promptly sent
employees from its human resource department to investigate second complaint ultimately
sending memorandum to all employees and holding meetings regarding what constitutes
appropriate workplace behavior had taken prompt and remedial action); Reed v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 19 F.3d 19 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding company that had a published policy
against sexual harassment and fired supervisor for having engaged in sexual activity in the
office but refused plaintiff's requested transfer due to alleged retaliation from other em-
ployees, as a response sufficient to relieve employer of liability); Saxton v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 536 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding company that investigated the complaint
the day after it was brought and transferred alleged harasser to different department
brought an end to any harassment and relieved it of any potential sexual harassment liabil-
ity); see also infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text for an illustration of a separation
deemed by the court to relieve the employer from sexual harassment liability.
140. 9 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 1993).




where she began performing secretarial and research functions. Nash was
later transferred to the accounting department and was assigned to work
under the supervision of John Sharp, a tax attorney. While Sharp held
the "first-line supervisory role," control of the terms and conditions of
Nash's employment was deemed to be in the hands of Sharp's boss, ac-
counting department manager, C. Edwin Wilson, in conjunction with the
human relations department.
Nash alleged that during the fall of 1990, Sharp subjected her to a bar-
rage of questions about her personal sex life that she found offensive. 143
Nash also received several sexually suggestive anonymous phone calls
during this period at her home which she believed came from Sharp but
never pursued this charge either directly with him or with the company.
In January of 1991, Nash received a memorandum of particular errors she
had made which she described as "constructive criticism." Sharp's per-
sonal questions continued, but Nash had ceased responding. In February
of 1992, Nash approached the personnel department and was immedi-
ately called for an interview with Margaret Schafer, ESI's Director of
Human Resources. During the next week, Shafer interviewed both Sharp
and Nash's female co-workers to investigate the allegations and in-
structed Sharp not to converse with Nash during the investigation. Sharp
contended that the conversations with Nash were voluntary and not cal-
culated to be sexually hostile, inappropriate, or intimidating. The follow-
ing Friday, Shafer transferred Nash to another position that had no effect
on Nash's pay rate or benefits. In Nash's deposition, she was unable to
articulate why she regarded this transfer as retaliatory and admitted that
it was not an adverse employment decision.
The court held that to establish an actionable claim of sexual harass-
ment, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that plaintiff belongs to a pro-
tected class; (2) that plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harass-
ment affected a term, condition or privilege of employment; and (5) that
the employer either knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to take prompt remedial action.1 44 The court then cited to the re-
cent Supreme Court case of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 145 for the affir-
mation that the hostile environment sexual harassment claim can be
determined only by looking at all of the circumstances in a given case. 146
The Nash court then stated: "Harris does not, however, support the
proposition that in all such cases, an employer will be held liable for a
violation of Title VII. An employer becomes liable for sexual harassment
only if he knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
take remedial action." 147
143. Id. at 403. Nash acknowledged that Sharp did not engage in any quid pro quo
harassment. Id.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of Harris.
146. Nash, 9 F.3d at 403-04.
147. Id. at 404.
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The court found Sharp, though in some ways a direct supervisor of
Nash's work, was not responsible for the terms and conditions of her em-
ployment and that the summary judgment record did not establish that
anyone within the company's hierarchy was aware of Nash's complaints
until she went to the personnel department. 48 The court also found that
the record contained no evidence that Sharp's conduct took place in pub-
lic and thus concluded that "the company did not know nor should it have
known" of Sharp's conduct toward Nash until she "complained to those
with the authority to address the problem."'1 49
Therefore, the court focused on the actions taken by Shafer, ESI Direc-
tor of Human Resources, when she was confronted with Nash's
charges.' 50 The court found that Shafer was unable to corroborate Nash's
allegations because Sharp denied the harassment and since other co-
workers had not experienced offensive behavior by him.' 51 The court
concluded that the investigation and decision to transfer "reflected a pru-
dent response to an unpleasant situation.1 152 The court commented that
Nash's transfer was not retaliation but instead was an act that insulated
her from further contact with Sharp that was successful because Nash
soon qualified for a raise and because Nash got along well with her new
boss.' 53 The existence of a written policy against sexual harassment and
the availability of a formal grievance procedure "counted strongly in
ESI's favor," leading the court to conclude that "[tjhe uncontested evi-
dence demonstrates a model of prompt, sensitive employer handling of
these very traumatic cases. 1 54
2. The Potential of Employer Liability to the Alleged Harasser
As discussed, an employer may insulate itself from liability for sexual
harassment by taking prompt and effective remedial action. The em-
ployer may, however, in some instances be faced with an action filed
against it by the alleged harasser.155
It must be remembered that in sexual harassment cases, there often
are three parties to be considered, the complaining employee, the
employer, and the accused harasser. Furthermore, the accused har-
asser is usually another employee whose rights must be factored into
the handling of any sexual harassment case during both the internal
complaint and legal proceeding stages. 156




151. Nash, 9 F.3d at 404.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 404 n.2.




been brought against the employer by the alleged harasser.157 Nonethe-
less, employers can take comfort in the larger number of cases in which
courts have recognized that a good faith investigation of the claims result-
ing in some form of discipline or termination will generally defeat claims
brought by the alleged harasser.' 58
B. A CLOSER LOOK AT EMPLOYER LIABILITY AND ITS RELATION TO
SUPERVISORS: THE EEOC's POSITION
The EEOC recognizes that "[w]hile the Vinson decision quoted the
Commission's brief at length, it neither endorsed nor rejected its posi-
tion."'1 59 The EEOC, therefore, interprets Vinson to require a careful ex-
amination into whether the supervisor in "hostile environment" cases was
acting in an "agency capacity."'160 The Commission concludes that appro-
priate factors to consider will include whether the employer had an ap-
propriate and effective complaint procedure and whether the employee
took advantage of such a procedure.' 6 1
The EEOC's 1990 Policy Guidance states that the first inquiry into em-
ployer liability should be "whether the employer knew or should have
known of the alleged harassment."'1 62 The Commission feels that direct
liability is appropriate where actual or constructive notice exists and the
employer failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.' 63
Regarding imputed liability, the Commission advocates an investigation
to determine whether the allegedly harassing supervisor was acting in an
"agency capacity."' 164 This investigation requires a determination of
whether the supervisor was acting within the scope of his employment or
whether his actions can be imputed to the employer under some excep-
tion to the "scope of employment" rule.' 65
157. See, e.g., Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 627-29 (W.D.
Tex. 1988) (holding that plaintiff had been discriminated against on the basis of his national
origin and that the alleged sexual harassment was merely a pretext for his termination).
But see Williams v. Maremont Corp., 875 F.2d 1476, 1485 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding the
termination of foreman under a breach of contract action ruling that public policy favors a
workplace free of offensive sexual harassment).
158. Panken, supra note 91, at 283.
159. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 71, § (D)(2)(a).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. § (D)(2)(b).
163. Id. The Commission notes that this is the same theory under which employers can
be held liable for harassment by co-workers. Id.; see, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881
F.2d 412, 421 (7th Cir. 1989); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1989),
affd & rev'd in part on different grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); Steele v. Offshore
Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989).
The Commission also comments that "[m]ost commonly an employer acquires actual
knowledge through first-hand observation, by the victim's internal complaint to other su-
pervisors or managers, or by a charge of discrimination." EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra
note 71, at n.29.




With regard to the scope of employment, the Policy Guidance states
that a supervisor's actions will generally be viewed as within his scope of
employment if they represent the authority actually vested in him.166 The
Commission goes on to state that "[i]t will rarely be the case that an em-
ployer will have authorized a supervisor to engage in sexual harass-
ment."'1 67 If, however, the employer becomes aware of the sexual
harassment and does nothing to stop it, by acquiescing, the employer will
be deemed to have brought the supervisor's actions within the scope of
employment.1 68
The Commission also recognizes that an employer can be held liable
under the theory of "apparent authority" for the acts of its agents. 169
"An employer is also liable for a supervisor's actions if these actions rep-
resent the exercise of authority that third parties reasonably believe him
to possess by virtue of his employer's conduct.' 170 The Commission de-
rives this standard from the general law of agency and believes that in the
absence of a strong, widely disseminated, and consistently enforced policy
against sexual harassment that includes an effective complaint procedure,
an employee could reasonably conclude that a harassing supervisor's be-
havior will be ignored, tolerated, or even condoned by the employer. 171
On the other hand, the Commission recognizes that, in the hostile envi-
ronment setting,172 an employer can divest a supervisor of this apparent
authority by implementing a strong policy against sexual harassment and
maintaining an effective complaint procedure. 173
Agency by estoppel is also recognized by the Commission as a closely
related theory of employer liability. Under this theory, an employer is
liable if he intentionally or carelessly causes an employee to mistakenly
believe that the supervisor is acting for the employer, or if the employer
166. Id. § (D)(2)(c)(1).
167. Id.
168. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 71, § (D)(2)(c)(1).
169. Id. § (D)(2)(c)(2).
170. Id.
171. Id. The Commission stated their rationale as follows:
This apparent authority of supervisors arises from their power over employ-
ees, including the power to make or substantially influence hiring, firing, pro-
motion and compensation decisions. A supervisor's capacity to create a
hostile environment is enhanced by the degree of authority conferred on him
by the employer, and he may rely upon apparent authority to force an em-
ployee to endure a harassing environment for fear of retaliation. If the em-
ployer has not provided an effective avenue to complain, then the supervisor
has unchecked, final control of the victim and it is reasonable to impute his
abuse of this power to the employer.
Id.
172. The EEOC maintains its position that an employer is always liable for supervisory
actions that affect the victim's employment status, such as hiring and promotion decisions,
and cautioned that this discussion of apparent authority is limited to "hostile environment"
cases. Id. at n.36.
173. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 71, § (D)(2)(c)(3). The Commission's ra-
tionale is that when employees are aware that recourse is available, they cannot reasonably
believe that an employer condones or authorizes the harassing work environment. Id.
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knows about the employee's mistaken belief and fails to correct it.174
Another avenue of employer liability recognized by the Commission is
imputed liability, where the employer is deemed as having been "negli-
gent or reckless" in supervising the harassed employee. This negligent
supervision is recognized by the Commission as being essentially the
same as holding the employer directly liable for its failure to act.175 Fur-
ther, the EEOC states that "[a]n employer cannot avoid liability by dele-
gating to another person a duty imposed by statute" and "[a]n employer
who assigns the performance of a non-delegable duty to an employee re-
mains liable for injuries resulting from the failure of the employee to
carry out the duty."'1 76 Lastly, the Commission recognizes that an em-
ployer may also be held liable if the existence of the agency relation aided
the supervisor in accomplishing the harassment. 177
C. CONCERN OVER DIFFERING STANDARDS FOR EMPLOYER
LIABILITY
While the issue of employer liability was not squarely before the
Supreme Court in the recent case of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,178 the
mere fact that the Supreme Court was revisiting the issue of sexual har-
assment caused employers concern over the murky area of employer lia-
bility in this arena. The Equal Employment Advisory Council179
submitted a brief amicus curiae in support of the respondent arguing that:
Any standard enunciated by this Court for employer liability for sex-
ual harassment should take into consideration anti-harassment poli-
cies and procedures established by employers in response to this
Court's guidance in Meritor. Where an employer has adopted a
strong company policy prohibiting workplace sexual harassment and
has established an adequate procedure for addressing complaints,
the employer cannot be held liable for a supervisor's or employee's
creation of a hostile environment of which the employer had no ac-
tual or constructive knowledge if the alleged victim failed to take
174. Id. § (D)(2)(c)(3). This liability includes the situation in which an employer is
aware of past incidents of sexual harassment and fails to respond appropriately thus caus-
ing its employees to reasonably believe that further incidents will be tolerated. Id.
175. Id. For courts applying a negligence type standard of employer liability, see Guess
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 821
F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989); Hall v. Gus Const. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th
Cir. 1988).
176. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 71, § (D)(2)(c)(3). The Policy Guidance
states: "Title VII imposes on employers a duty to provide their employees with a work-
place free of sexual harassment. An employer who entrusts that duty to an employee is
liable for injuries caused by the employee's breach of the duty." Id.
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of Harris.
179. The Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC or Council) is a voluntary asso-
ciation of employers whose membership includes over 270 corporations, all subject to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as other equal employment statutes and regula-
tions. The author includes their concerns and suggestions due to the importance of the
employer in establishing workable sexual harassment requirements and mandates. The
EEAC's brief amicus curiae provides some insight into the prudent employer's concerns
surrounding sexual harassment in the workplace.
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advantage of that procedure or if the employer took prompt and ap-
propriate action. 180
The Council advocated that strict liability not apply in a hostile environ-
ment setting, arguing that when an employer has in place an adequate
policy to remedy harassment, allowing recovery to a plaintiff who has
failed to report the harassing conduct is, in essence, the same as strict
liability.181 Similarly, the Council advocated that prompt and effective
action by an employer who is aware of the harassing behavior should also
obviate liability, pointing out that an employer who can show a thorough
and bona fide investigation leading to a rational conclusion and appropri-
ate action, should be credited for such efforts. 182
The Council also expressed concern regarding the issue of employer
liability for action taken against the allegedly harassing employee and
stated:
Indeed, if an anti-harassment policy and procedure are effective, po-
tentially harassing conduct should surface and be dealt with before it
reaches a truly critical level. Where an employer, after investigation,
believes in good faith that inappropriate behavior has occurred, the
employer must be able to take immediate action, including discipline
or even discharge of the offender without facing legal action by the
harasser.' 83
The Council noted that prompt and remedial action is a key component
to an effective anti-harassment procedure, but that such disciplinary ac-
tion by the employer is "all too often" met with resistance, if not legal
action, by the alleged harasser. 184
[T]he employer's only legitimate choice is to take effective action to
halt the harassment, and let the chips fall where they may. Unfortu-
nately, that employer's reward for its commendable behavior may be
lengthy and costly litigation. Employees who have been disciplined
for harassment may claim that the employer's reason is libelous,
180. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of
Respondent at summary of argument #2, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367
(1993) (No. 92-1168).
181. Id. The Council argued:
A plaintiff's refusal to make use of an available recourse that could have
remedied the situation must negate any employer liability. Even the most
conscientious, enlightened employer cannot control every day-to-day action
of every employee, and must know of harassing behavior before it can take
action to halt it. Holding such an employer liable for the actions of an em-
ployee that violate an express company policy when the employer did not
know, and did not have reason to know of the offensive conduct, unfairly





184. Id. That concern may be overblown. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying
text for a discussion of potential employer liability to the alleged harasser.
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slanderous, defamatory, or a pretext for discrimination. 185
The Council advocates that an employer's good faith, i.e., reasonable be-
lief that an employee engaged in sexual harassment, be sufficient to es-
tablish a legitimate reason for taking disciplinary action, and rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination. 186
While the area of sexual harassment litigation and liability is indeed
murky, a prudent employer should understand that prevention of sexual
harassment and protection from sexual harassment liability is managea-
ble.' 8 7 As one commentator noted:
It must be remembered that to state a prima facie hostile environ-
ment case, a plaintiff must show that the employer knew, or should
have known, of the harassment and failed to take remedial action.
This element is the legal equivalent of a safety net for employers.
Even if harassment occurs, liability may be avoided if the employer
has an effective sexual harassment policy and appropriate action is
taken. 88
To the contrary, it is the sexual harassment victim who needs to worry
about her ability to obtain judicial relief under the current laws due to the
difficulty of establishing an actionable sexual harassment claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
One way to combat sex discrimination is to take a more liberal stance
towards employer liability. 189 Even with the recent passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and its expansion of remedies,190 relief is limited by
caps on the compensatory and punitive damages awards.' 9' More impor-
tantly, the employer is the only entity that can be sued for sexual harass-
ment under Title VII.192 This makes the imposition of employer liability
a crucial component of providing sexual harassment victims with relief.
The courts' current lack of uniform standards for employer liability
"reduces Title VII's usefulness by further restricting the already limited
relief for sexual harassment.' 1 93 The void of judicial recognition and un-
derstanding as to the context and effects of sexual harassment in the lives
of women must also change. This recognition would give judges and ju-
185. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of
Respondent at summary of argument #2, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367
(1993) (No. 92-1168).
186. Id.
187. See Pechman, supra note 94.
188. Id. at n.30.
189. Kristin D. Sanko, Employer Liability and Sexual Harassment Under Section 1983:
A Comment on Starrett v. Wadley, 67 DENv. U. L. REV. 571, 585 (1990). Sanko argues
that this liberal stance would force employers to take precautions against sexual harass-
ment in the workplace and convey to employees that such conduct will not be tolerated.
Id.
190. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various caps on
Title VII relief for sexual harassment claims.





ries a better framework in which to evaluate these cases and would in-
crease the level of predictability.
In the easy case of quid pro quo harassment, courts have correctly
applied strict employer liability. In cases that are not as clear cut, how-
ever, courts need to examine a plaintiff's potential quid pro quo claim in
more depth 94 and realize that, from the victim's perspective, many, if not
most, of a supervisor's actions are perceived by the victim as being inexo-
rably intertwined with the threat of economic detriment. Recognition of
this interrelationship by the judiciary would give a greater number of sex-
ual harassment victims a remedy by not automatically foreclosing their
quid pro quo claim.
Sexual harassment plaintiffs are further hindered by the Meritor
Court's rejection of strict employer liability for hostile environment har-
assment by supervisors. This holding is inconsistent with general Title
VII law and needs to be reevaluated. Courts need to apply strict em-
ployer liability to hostile environment harassment by supervisors, thereby
sending the message that sexual harassment is a serious violation of the
law that will not be tolerated.
Lastly, the overall confusion and lack of consistency in hostile environ-
ment litigation hurts both employers and employees. In cases where the
employer has a workable sexual harassment policy in place and can show
that it took prompt and appropriate action, the prudent employer should
be shielded from liability in cases involving non-supervisory personnel.
Additionally, employers need to have sufficient latitude to investigate
these claims without fear of retaliation by the alleged harasser. In cases
where the employer does not have a workable sexual harassment policy
and complaint procedure in place, however, courts should not exempt
employers from liability.
As the EEOC states, "[p]revention is the best tool for the elimination
of harassment.' 95 Employers who are aware of and concerned with
eliminating sexual harassment from their workplace deserve to limit their
liability for potential sexual harassment claims. Those employers who
tolerate or ignore sexual harassment in their workplace deserve to suffer
the consequences. Victims of sexual harassment also deserve a remedy,
and this must come from holding employers liable who fail to provide a
workplace free of harassment.
194. Instead of automatically characterizing the claim as a potential hostile environ-
ment harassment claim, courts should look more closely at potential quid pro quo harass-
ment claim.
195. 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(d) (1993).
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